Security and Privacy-Preserving Computer Vision:

Models, Data, and Adaptation under Real-World Constraints

Kartik Patwari

Committee:
Prof. Chen-Nee Chuah (Chair)
Prof. Houman Homayoun
Prof. Avesta Sasan

UCDAVIS
ELECTRICAL AND COMPUTER ENGINEERING

Contents

From Lab to Deployment

- Vision systems operate **outside controlled environments**
- Deployed across edge devices, public infrastructure, and regulated domains
- Each layer introduces different **assumptions** and **threat models**



Chen, et al. (2019) "Deep learning with edge computing: A review."

Real-World Breaks Assumptions

Research Setting

- Controlled datasets and benchmarks
- Full access to training data and labels
- Centralized training and inference
- Trusted execution environments
- Accuracy is primary success metric

Real-World

- Limited or no access to labeled data
- Runtime device constraints
- Untrusted execution environments
- Efficiency, cost, power
- Full access to training data and labels
- Shifting domains
- Data policies
- Privacy & Ethical concerns

Deployment Exposes Gaps

Example: Security threat of prompt injection attacks against LLMs/VLMs



Chen, et al. (2025) "Jailbreaking LLMs & VLMs: Mechanisms, Evaluation, and Unified Defenses"

Deployment Exposes Gaps

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

Chen, et al. (2025) "Jailbreaking LLMs & VLMs: Mechanisms, Evaluation, and Unified Defenses"

Studying Computer Vision under Real-World Constraints

Model Security



Privacy Preservation



Domain Adaptation



Contents

Background & Motivation



Background & Motivation: Model Extraction



Black-Box Setting

Side-Channel Attacks (SCAs)



Architecture

CNN	STFT	Conv layer	1-2-5; 2-3-5; 3-3-5	3
		Max pool layer	2-2	1
		Fully connection layer	1980-32; 32-5	2
Dropout	**Optimizer**	**Training Epochs**	**Learning Rate**	**Batch Size**
0.5	Adam	100	0.02	15

Hyper-parameters



Weights

White or Grey-Box Knowledge

Background & Motivation: Model Extraction

Security Attacks!
E.g., Adversarial Evasian



Goodfellow et al. (2014) Explaining and harnessing adversarial examples.



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

Weights

White or Grey-Box Knowledge

Prior Side-Channel Attacks

Attack Classifications:

1. Invasive vs. Non-Invasive
2. Active vs. Passive
3. On-site vs. Remote

Side-Channel Attack	Side Channel	NI	P	R	Limitations
Cache Telepathy (USENIX '20)	Cache	●	◐	●	Prime+Probe, LLC sharing
DeepSniffer (ASPLOS '20)	Memory Access	◐	●	○	Physical access, bus snooping
LeakyDNN (DSN '20)	GPU	●	◐	●	Cloud GPU, profilers, DoS
CSI-NN (USENIX '19)	Power / EM	●	●	○	Physical access required
Our Work (EuroS&P '22)	**System Stats**	●	●	●	**None**

●: Yes, ◐: Partial, ○: No.

Threat Model

- **Attacker's Goal**
  - Fingerprint model architecture family from **popular, state-of-the-art DNNs**
  - Use knowledge for downstream **adversarial attacks**

- **Attacker's Knowledge**
  - The victim device (to have a **surrogate attacker device**)
  - DNN is **primary running application**

- **Attacker's Capability**
  - Able to collect **global system-level statistics** available at **user-space level**
    - E.g. ***tegrastats*** on NVIDIA Jetson devices

Attack Pipeline



Fingerprintable Traces?

- Target NVIDIA Jetson Edge Devices
- Side-Channel observations via ***tegrastats*** tool
  - Available at user-space
  - Reports global shared statistics: total RAM, GPU, and GPU usage



(a) VGG Family (b) ResNet Family (c) SqueezeNet Family (d) DenseNet Family

Model Fingerprinting

- Use RAM trace, GPU and CPU % usage
- Extract random chunks from execution
- Compute various time series features (sktime):
  - Statistical (e.g., mean)
  - Distribution (e.g., entropy)
  - Frequency (e.g., FFT coeff)
  - Dynamics (e.g., peaks)



Experimental Setup

- NVIDIA Jetson Devices
  - **Jetson Nano (4GB)**
    - 4-core ARM Cortex A57, 128-Core Maxwell, 4GB Memory
  - **Jetson TX2 & NX**
- Dataset curated with **8 model families**
  - Split into **Test set 1** and **Test set 2**
- All models from Pytorch, **ImgNet pretr.**
- Classification on **ImgNet test set**
- Attacker classifier: **RandomForest**

Model Family	Train/Test Set 1	Test Set 2
VGG (V)	V11, V19	V13, V16
ResNet (RN)	RN18, RN50, RN152	RN34, RN101
SqueezeNet (SN)	SN1.0	SN1.1
DenseNet (DN)	DN121, DN201	DN161, DN169
ShuffleNet (SH)	SHv2-0.5	SHv2-1.0
Inception (I)	I-v3	N/A
MobileNet (MN)	MN-v2	N/A
AlexNet (AN)	AN	N/A

Sequence Length Analysis

- Train and test with varying sequence length chunks
- Performance plateau's after **8s** chunk
- Minimum 4s needed for >90% accuracy



(a) VGG Family (b) ResNet Family



Feature Ablation and Transferability

- RAM is most important for classification





All



RAM

Platform Portability

- Repeated attack setup on **NVIDIA Jetson NX** and **Jetson TX2**
- Attack **successfully transfers** with high fingerprinting accuracy
- Similar trend: **RAM** is critical feature

Platform	Features						
Dataset	All	RAM	GPU	CPU	RAM+GPU	RAM+CPU	GPU+CPU
NX Test 1	98.5%	98.6%	94.5%	83.2%	**98.9%**	98.2%	94.7%
NX Test 2	79.8%	76.8%	79%	65.2%	**86.6%**	77.4%	77.2%
TX2 Test 1	98.9%	**99.7%**	97.5%	90.8%	99.5%	97.9%	97.1%
TX2 Test 2	**95.6%**	88.8%	60.6%	89.6%	93.4%	94.0%	82.0%

Robustness Study

- Concurrently run **AES encryption app** in background
- Vary file sizes from **10, 50, 100MB** for encryption
- Sharp **fingerprint accuracy drop**

Background App	Test Set 1	Test Set 2
AES BG 10MB	86.4	69.6
AES BG 50MB	42.6	38.6
AES BG 100MB	16.9	21.4



(a) VGGs + AES (10MB) (b) ResNets + AES (10MB)

(c) VGGs + AES (50MB) (d) ResNets + AES (50MB)

(e) VGGs + AES (100MB) (f) ResNets + AES (100MB)

Robustness Study

CIFAR-10 Data and Models

Use lower resolution input images

Test Set	Accuracy (%)
Test 1	71.7
Test 2	82.4

Different Framework - TensorFlow

Run over TF models

Test Set	Accuracy (%)
Test 1	99.1
Test 2	94.0

Fingerprint Knowledge Enhances Adversarial Attacks

- Ensemble adversarial attack using ***DeepFool***[7] *attack* on *victim* ***DenseNet121***

Model Ensemble (Adversarial Generation)	DenseNet121 Accuracy (%)		Accuracy Drop (%)
	Benign	Attack: DeepFool	
ResNets (RN50, RN101, RN152)	84.14	61.02	23.12
MobileNets (MN, MN-v2)	83.43	59.46	23.97
VGGs (V16, V19)	82.73	51.07	31.66
Mix 1 (MN, RN50, EfficientNet)	83.85	63.90	19.95
Mix 2 (MN, V16, EfficientNet)	83.69	58.08	25.61
Mix 3 (MN, DN121, EfficientNet)	83.72	53.55	30.17
Mix 4 (RN152, MN-v2, DN201)	83.07	52.02	31.05
DenseNets (DN121, DN169, DN201)	83.13	28.23	**54.90**

Wrong model family

Random mix with model families

Correct model family

Neural Network Filter Pruning for Defense?

- Pruning is **often used as defense** benchmarks for adversarial attacks
- Pruning Goal: Remove filters using importance criterion
- Model typically finetuned post-pruning to recover accuracy



Luo et al. (2017) Thinet: A filter level pruning method for deep neural network compression.

L_p *Filter Importance:*

$$\|F\|_p = \sqrt[p]{\sum_{c,k_1,k_2=1}^{C,K,K} |F(c,k_1,k_2)|^p}$$

Benchmarking for Adversarial Robustness and Pruning

- Pruned models found to be fingerprintable
- At the time, fewer works showed extensive studies on effect of pruning on adversarial robustness
- Grey-Box Adversary, untargetted attack scenario



Filter Pruning Baseline

Pruning %	Benign Test Accuracy		
	MobineNet	DenseNet121	ResNet50
0	79.2	83.3	78.1
10	83.7 +4.5	86.9 +3.6	80.6 +2.5
20	83.5 +4.3	86.2 +2.9	79.0 +0.9
30	81.8 +2.6	86.7 +3.4	82.0 +3.9
40	81.1 +1.9	85.2 +1.9	74.9 -3.2
50	80.0 +0.8	81.3 -2.0	70.4 -7.7

Model	Inference time (ms)			
	0%	10%	30%	50%
MobileNet	23.48 ± 2.46	20.86 ± 2.08	**20.39 ± 1.41**	21.46 ± 1.97
ResNet50	95.07 ± 4.82	88.35 ± 4.29	89.40 ± 5.71	**81.41 ± 3.82**
DenseNet121	71.13 ± 5.27	65.10 ± 3.80	61.09 ± 4.17	**60.55 ± 4.05**

Pruned Models' Adversarial Robustness

Model	Pruning % (L_2)	Attack					
		DF	FGSM	BIM	PGD	APGD	UP
RN50	0	37.1	15.4	7.0	7.8	4.9	15.6
	10	39.7 (+2.6)	11.9 (-3.5)	7.2 (+0.2)	7.5 (-0.3)	3.9 (-1.0)	14.1 -1.5
	20	39.7 +2.6	13.6 -1.8	7.6 +0.6	7.5 -0.3	4.2 -0.7	11.8 -3.8
	30	40.4 (+3.3)	13.6 -1.8	7.4 +0.4	7.5 -0.3	4.1 -0.8	14.9 -0.7
	40	35.9 -1.2	13.2 -2.2	7.4 +0.4	7.1 -0.7	4.4 -0.5	11.4 -4.2
	50	33.8 -3.3	13.0 -2.4	6.9 -0.1	8.3 +0.5	6.5 +1.6	11.0 -4.6
MN	0	40.7	12.0	5.1	7.4	8.5	58.8
	10	43.0 +2.3	12.4 +0.4	4.1 -1.0	4.1 -3.3	3.7 -4.8	64.9 +6.1
	20	43.0 +2.3	12.3 +0.3	3.5 -1.6	4.6 -2.8	4.1 -4.4	63.0 +4.2
	30	42.3 +1.6	11.3 -0.7	3.8 -1.3	4.2 -3.2	4.4 -4.1	60.1 +1.3
	40	41.8 +1.1	12.8 +0.8	3.9 -1.2	4.7 -2.7	5.8 -2.7	60.3 +1.5
	50	41.8 +1.1	11.1 -0.9	5.6 +0.5	6.7 -0.7	8.0 -0.5	59.0 +0.2

- Adversarial attack generated from base model and fed pruned counterparts

DN121	0	38.7	11.3	8.0	7.1	4.5	10.2
	10	38.1 -0.6	11.6 +0.3	6.5 -1.5	6.7 -0.4	3.9 -0.6	10.0 -0.2
	20	38.2 -0.5	12.0 +0.7	6.1 -1.9	6.8 -0.3	4.0 -0.5	10.6 +0.4
	30	38.8 +0.1	10.9 -0.4	6.7 -1.3	6.8 -0.3	3.8 -0.7	11.7 +1.5
	40	37.8 -0.9	10.6 -0.7	6.5 -1.5	6.7 -0.4	3.6 -0.9	10.3 +0.1
	50	35.6 -3.1	10.3 -1.0	6.7 -1.3	7.1 +0.0	3.8 -0.7	10.0 -0.2

Transferability of Adversarial Attacks

- Adversarial attacks generated from base model ***ResNet50***

Model	Pruning % (L_2)	Attack (Surrogate: RN50)					
		DF	FGSM	BIM	PGD	APGD	UP
MN	0	41.0	12.6	9.3	12.5	13.5	11.7
	10	45.0 +4.0	13.0 +0.4	9.1 -0.2	9.0 -3.5	9.1 -4.4	11.3 -0.4
	20	44.0 +3.0	12.5 -0.1	9.2 -0.1	9.6 -2.9	9.2 -4.3	11.2 -0.5
	30	43.0 +2.0	12.8 +0.2	9.0 -0.3	8.5 -4.0	8.7 -4.8	11.2 -0.5
	40	41.4 +0.4	12.1 -0.5	9.7 +0.4	10.3 -2.2	11.1 -2.4	12.0 +0.3
	50	41.0 +0.0	10.9 -1.7	9.9 +0.6	9.8 -2.7	10.8 -2.7	11.4 -0.3
DN121	0	43.3	14.3	11.7	11.5	10.4	11.6
	10	45.3 +2.0	12.4 -1.9	8.7 -3.0	8.2 -3.3	6.5 -3.9	10.0 -1.6
	20	44.3 +1.0	12.4 -1.9	7.4 -4.3	8.1 -3.4	6.8 -3.6	10.1 -1.5
	30	44.4 +1.1	12.2 -2.1	8.2 -3.5	8.6 -2.9	6.2 -4.2	9.9 -1.7
	40	43.9 +0.6	12.4 -1.9	7.4 -4.3	8.6 -2.9	5.8 -4.6	11.0 -0.6
	50	39.6 -3.7	12.1 -2.2	7.2 -4.5	9.7 -1.8	6.1 -4.3	10.0 -1.6

Takeaways

- **Global-aggregate statistics** can **leak distinguishable traces** among DNN model architecture families
  - While being **passive, remote, and stealthy**!
- Robust to **minor noise** and **platform portable**
- Knowledge of architecture family can **improve effectiveness of ensemble adversarial attacks**
- **Pruning** is an ineffective defense
- **Researchers should consider deployed threats!**

Model Security: Technical Contribution

- Showed a new DNN family extraction security vulnerability for CPU-GPU NVIDIA edge devices
- Introduce architecture family ‘fingerprinting’
- Fingerprinting can improve semi-black box evasion attack effectiveness by x2
- Publications
  - **K. Patwari**, S. M. Hafiz, H. Wang, H. Homayoun, Z. Shafiq, and C-N. Chuah, "*DNN Model Architecture Fingerprinting Attack on CPU-CPU Edge Devices.*" **EuroS&P 2022**
  - **K. Patwari***, B. Vora*, S. M. Hafiz, Z. Shafiq, and C-N. Chuah, "*Establishing a Benchmark for Adversarial Robustness of Compressed Deep Learning Models After Pruning*," **ICML W. AdvML Frontiers 2023**

Contents

Image Dataset Trends

~1.4 M
Images
[2009]

Curated web image collection, **manual labeling** via crowdsourcing

~400 M
Image-Text Pairs
[2021]

LAION-5B: A NEW ERA OF OPEN LARGE-SCALE MULTI-MODAL DATASETS

~5.8 B
Image-Text Pairs
[2022]

Filtered from **Common Crawl** using **CLIP similarity**

Data Privacy in AI

TECH

Google Exposed User Data, Feared Repercussions of Disclosing to Public

Google opted not to disclose to users its discovery of a bug that gave outside developers access to private data. It found no evidence of misuse.

Source: The Wall Street Journal

Google hit with lawsuit alleging it stole data from millions of users to train its AI tools

By Catherine Thorbecke, CNN
Updated 8:48 AM EDT, Wed July 12, 2023

Source: CNN Business

AI and Privacy: The privacy concerns surrounding AI, its potential impact on personal data

ET Online • Last Updated: Apr 25, 2023, 08:31 PM IST

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Source: The Economic Times

Artificial intelligence (AI)

'I didn't give permission': Do AI's backers care about data law breaches?

Regulators around world are cracking down on content being hoovered up by ChatGPT, Stable Diffusion and others

Alex Hern *and* Dan Milmo
Mon 10 Apr 2023 10.10 BST

Source: The Guardian

Regulatory Pressure: Privacy in Public Visual Data

- **GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation)** , **CCPA (California Consumer Privacy Act)** , etc. impose strict requirements on the public release and processing of personal data
- Visual data containing **identifiable individuals is considered personal data**, even when collected in public spaces.
- Regulations require **pseudonymization or anonymization** of individuals prior to public release or secondary use.

Images Contain Rich Private/Personal Data!

- Images contain **PIIs (Personal identifiable Information)**
- Exposing PII can lead to a range of risks
  - Identity theft, copyright, unauthorized misuse





Images from Google's *OpenImages* Dataset!
Scraped without consent

Images Contain Rich Private/Personal Data!

Data Access without Consent



How can we make data without consent usable?

Image Anonymization!

Popular Anonymization Methods in Computer Vision

- Popular methods used in CV Anonymization:
  - Mask, Blur/Pixelate, Inpaint, Synthesis (Generative)
- To apply method, PII region of interest must be detected
  - Our focus: post detection anonymization
- Focused on **faces** and **person (full body)**

Original | Mask | Blur | Inpaint | Generative

Rethinking Image Anonymization and Pseudonymization

Understanding Image Anonymization from Human Perspective:

How do humans perceive anonymized images?
Do current metrics support this?

Designing Human Pseudonymization for Commercial Use:

How can we replace real individuals with non-identifiable counterparts?
What visual attributes must be preserved for downstream utility?





Image Anonymization: The Human Perspective

- Humans can assess anonymity from various visual cues in image
- Currently measured via Re-IDentification
  - Binary evaluation
- Anonymization is a human perspective problem!
  - “Degree of Anonymity”
  - Need a human-centric evaluation!



Curating a New Dataset

- Prior vision learning uses human ground truth supervision
- Anonymization focus on:
  - Person (Full Body)
  - Faces
- Each image anonymized using all common techniques
  - Mask, Blur/Pixelate, InPaint, Generative
- Humans score 1-10 degree of anonymity achieved
  - **Is this valid?**

10: Highest Anonymity

1: Lowest Anonymity

Do Existing Metrics Compare to Human Assessment?

We propose a new metric, **PerceptAnon**, which is better aligned to human judgement!



Diving Deeper into Human Understanding

- Consider a synthetically generated human
- Individual in image is **anonymized** (**local** view)
- Whole image may be **pseudonymized** (**global** view)



GDPR: *"the use of additional information can lead to identification of individuals".*

Global and Local Viewpoints

- Create Variants of each image and anonymization method
  - Allows learning importance of background cues
  - Direct focus on global and local viewpoints

Scoped Annotations

- We propose two ways to evaluate anonymized images
- *Anno1:* Show annotators both original and anonymized
  - Allows direct comparison
- *Anno2:* Show annotators only anonymized
  - Reflective of real-world scenario

Anno1

Original Anonymized

Anno2

Anonymized

PerceptAnon Metric

- PerceptAnon is trained for both ***HA1*** and ***HA2*** assessment types
- ***HA1*** directly is trained on **human scores**
- ***HA2*** uses a **Siamese network** to consider **original image and local** anonymized counterpart



Experimental Setup

- Dataset split to 60:20:20 train, val, test
- Curated from Person (COCO, VOC), and Face (CelebA, LFW) datasets
- ResNet 50 used for main results
- Existing image quality & assessment metrics:
  - Peak Signal to Noise Ratio (PSNR)
  - Structural Similarity Index (SSIM)
  - Learned Perceptual Image Patch Similarity (LPIPS)
  - Fréchet Inception Distance (FID)
- Evaluation: alignment with human scores (correlation)
  - Spearman's Rank (ρ)
  - Kendall's Rank (τ)

Correlation Against Human assessments

Spearman's (ρ) and Kendall's (τ) correlation of traditional image assessment metrics and PerceptAnon with human annotations on our dataset splits. PerceptAnon has consistently the best correlation with human perception.

HA1

Train/Test Setup	Metrics	PSNR	MSE	LPIPS	SSIM	FID	PerceptAnon (Ours)
All	ρ	-0.7011	0.7011	0.7675	-0.8358	0.6578	**0.8817**
	τ	-0.5018	0.5018	0.5544	**-0.7601**	0.4667	0.7119
LOOV-VOC	ρ	-0.7448	0.7448	0.8244	-0.8185	0.6995	**0.8603**
	τ	-0.5437	0.5437	0.6288	-0.6289	0.5095	**0.6570**
LOOV-COCO	ρ	-0.771	0.771	0.805	-0.7702	0.733	**0.8643**
	τ	-0.5649	0.5649	0.6051	-0.5712	0.5385	**0.6845**
LOOV-LFW	ρ	-0.7354	0.7354	0.7574	-0.7615	0.7289	**0.8278**
	τ	-0.5256	0.5256	0.5487	-0.5509	0.5141	**0.6353**
LOOV-CelebA	ρ	-0.6239	0.6239	0.7301	-0.7321	0.6634	**0.8478**
	τ	-0.4407	0.4407	0.5151	-0.518	0.4594	**0.6549**
Task-Person	ρ	-0.7313	0.7313	0.7909	-0.75	0.6858	**0.8831**
	τ	-0.524	0.524	0.5929	-0.5452	0.4971	**0.7120**
Task-Face	ρ	-0.7547	0.7547	0.7906	-0.7838	0.7447	**0.8774**
	τ	-0.5528	0.5528	0.5887	-0.5825	0.547	**0.6940**

HA2

Train/Test Setup	Metrics	PSNR	MSE	LPIPS	SSIM	FID	PerceptAnon (Ours)
All	ρ	-0.7631	0.7631	0.7622	-0.7655	0.6444	**0.8421**
	τ	-0.5434	0.5434	0.5385	-0.5448	0.4456	**0.6477**
LOOV-VOC	ρ	-0.7833	0.7833	0.7869	-0.7971	0.6203	**0.8218**
	τ	-0.575	0.575	0.5694	-0.5827	0.4338	**0.6211**
LOOV-COCO	ρ	-0.7941	0.7941	0.7851	-0.785	0.6478	**0.8404**
	τ	-0.5842	0.5842	0.5713	-0.5739	0.4559	**0.6456**
LOOV-LFW	ρ	-0.7551	0.7551	0.7137	-0.7358	0.7032	**0.8462**
	τ	-0.5243	0.5243	0.4683	-0.5001	0.4536	**0.6495**
LOOV-CelebA	ρ	-0.7157	0.7157	0.7082	-0.7542	0.679	**0.8250**
	τ	-0.4875	0.4875	0.4753	-0.5354	0.4569	**0.6270**
Task-Person	ρ	-0.7757	0.7757	0.7833	-0.7997	0.6408	**0.8320**
	τ	-0.5647	0.5647	0.5668	-0.5872	0.4477	**0.6328**
Task-Face	ρ	-0.7435	0.7435	0.6956	-0.7623	0.6756	**0.8590**
	τ	-0.5154	0.5154	0.4537	-0.5387	0.4454	**0.6675**

Ablation Study: Impact of Granularity and Task

- Training and evaluation on varying levels and ranges of granularity with binning
  - Binary, 3, 5 (Likert scale), 10 scale
- Trained using regressive (MSE) and classification loss (CE)





Further Ablation Studies

Weighted CE loss vs standard CE for class imbalance



Impact of model backbone



Qualitative Results



Qualitative Results



Takeaways

- Existing image comparison and assessment metrics are not grounded in human assessment of anonymity
- Image Anonymity is a spectrum not binary!
- Holistic image anonymization for human interpretation must consider background and auxiliary cues
- A combination of local and global view of image allows us to study image anonymity for both human vision and machine vision

Images for Training, Pure Synthetic data?

- Pure synthetically generated and rendered avatars
- Traditionally used for augmentation
- Wood et al. (ICCV 2021) showed practical downstream performance

Wood et al. (ICCV 2021) “Fake it till you make it”

Image Anonymization for Commercial Use?

- Most typical commercial use of data is for training models
- PII removal (masking) offers best privacy
- Privacy and downstream utility both matter!



Solution: Generative Models!

- Generative Models help preserve context and utility
- Allow to create domain matched outputs
- **Goal**: Retain context and labels!
  - Commercial use of labeled public datasets



Orientation: Looking up
Class: Tennis player
Clothing: Yellow t-shirt



Existing Generative Anonymization Methods



Existing Generative Anonymization Methods

	Original	DP2 (WACV'24)	Mask-SD (ICCV'23)	Pose-SD (NeurIPS'24)
				
Privacy (Removal)		✓	✓	✗
Pose		✓	✗	✓
Scene Integrity		✓	✓	✗
Prompt Control		✗	✗	✗
Image Quality		✗	✗	✓

Existing Generative Anonymization Methods

	DP2 (WACV'24)	Mask-SD (ICCV'23)	Pose-SD (NeurIPS'24)	**RefSD (Ours)**
Privacy (Removal)	✓	✓	✗	✓
Pose	✓	✗	✓	✓
Scene Integrity	✓	✓	✗	✓
Prompt Control	✗	✗	✗	✓
Image Quality	✗	✗	✓	✓

Rendering Refined Diffusion (RefSD)

RefSD removes humans completely and replaces them with pose-aligned 3D rendered avatars.



RefSD Pipeline: A Training-Free Approach to Anonymization



Retaining Utility: Prompt Design

RefSD Prompt:

Prefix + Attribute Prompt + Suffix

Prefix:
seen from front
seen from behind

Attribute Prompt:
A {**age**} {**ethnicity**} {**gender**} with {**body attr**}, showing {**emotion**} emotion.

Suffix:
The image is natural, realistic, sharp focus, high detail, medium format photograph, person, (Nikon DSLR Camera, 8K resolution, Detailed body features).

Prompt Complexity

Basic Prompt:

A {age} person.

A {ethnicity} person.

Simple Prompt:

A {age} {ethnicity} {gender} with {body attr}, showing {emotion} emotion.

Medium Prompt:

A {age} {ethnicity} {gender} with clearly {body attr}, showing exaggerated {emotion} emotion.

Complex Prompt:

A {age} {ethnicity} {gender} with clearly {body attr}, showing exaggerated {emotion} emotion. + Suffix

HumanGenAI Attribute Fidelity Framework

- Large scale human evaluation on various aspects important to privacy and utility
- Follow PerceptAnon style: 5-point likert scales
- Help understand RefSD's ability to generate various attributes



Impact of Prompt Complexity





Individual Fine-Grain Attribute Fidelity





Fine-Grain Attribute Translation





Privacy Metric: Person Re-Identification (Re-ID)

- Person Re-ID on Market-1501 dataset with OSNet model
- Metric: Recall @ k (R@k) and Mean Average Precision (mAP)
- Query images are anonymized, gallery remain original
- Lower Recall / mAP indicates better anonymization performance

Method	R@1 ↓	R@5 ↓	R@10 ↓	mAP ↓
Original	93.3	97.6	98.5	82.8
MaskOut	**27.4**	**29.7**	**30.7**	**23.8**
WeakBlur	39.2	49.1	54.0	33.7
StrongBlur	31.5	38.4	41.5	28.1
Mask-SD [51]	28.4	32.0	33.8	24.6
DP2: SG-GAN [18]	40.3	46.3	49.2	34.5
DP2: TriA-GAN [16]	40.1	44.6	46.5	35.1
RefSD (Ours)	**27.5**	**29.9**	**31.0**	**23.9**

RefSD achieves privacy standards akin to full masking-out humans.

Image Utility Metric: Downstream Training

- Classification on *RAF-DB* dataset for Emotion, Age, Gender, and Ethnicity
- Train set is anonymized using *Mask-SD*, *DP2*, and *RefSD*
- Model evaluated on original test dataset
- *ViT-Base/16* trained from scratch for 200 epochs (see paper for details)

Train Imgs	Emotion	Age	Gender	Ethnicity
Original	41.5	57.0	60.6	77.5
Mask-SD	38.7 (-2.8)	45.3 (-11.7)	50.8 (-9.8)	72.1 (-5.4)
DP2	33.0 (-8.5)	42.2 (-14.8)	**58.0 (-2.6)**	**76.6 (-0.9)**
RefSD	**39.6 (-1.9)**	**48.4 (-8.6)**	52.9 (-7.7)	68.2 (-9.3)

Image Utility Metric: Downstream Training (RefSD only)

- Classification on *RAF-DB* dataset for Emotion, Age, Gender, and Ethnicity

  R→O : Pretrained on *RefSD*, Fine tuned on Original

  R+O : Combined *RefSD* and Original images train set

- *DINOv2+FasterRCNN* detection model trained on *OpenImages* for person detection

Task	Original (O)	RefSD (R)	R→O	R+O
Classification				
Emotion	41.5 / 41.5	36.3 / 39.6	**45.3** / 42.2	44.3 / 42.0
Age	58.4 / 57.0	48.2 / 48.4	58.1 / 55.7	**59.9** / 58.5
Gender	61.9 / 60.6	53.1 / 52.9	64.4 / **65.1**	**73.0** / 63.4
Ethnicity	78.2 / 77.5	67.6 / 68.2	78.8 / **77.6**	**79.9** / 77.5
Detection				
Person	25.3 / 32.2	26.4 / 33.2	**30.8** / **38.8**	–

Table 7: Trained on ViT-Tiny/16 / ViT-Base/16 backbones.

Qualitative Results: Full Body

Qualitative Results: Face

Qualitative Results: Direct Comparions to DP2



Failure Cases

Takeaways

- GDPR requires strict elimination of identity, hence human removal
- Synthetic avatar gives highest privacy guarantees (identity free by nature)
- Diffusion allows to bridge domain gap to improve downstream utility
- Full human assessment audits of stable diffusion shows various pitfalls in fine grain attributes and generation, not considered by many works

Privacy-Preserving Computer Vision: Technical Contributions

- PerceptAnon
  - We propose a novel metric to quantify entire image anonymization with a human perspective focus
  - We propose new ways to understand and assess image perceptual anonymity
- RefSD
  - We propose a new image pseudonymization pipeline that combines rendering and diffusion
  - We achieve gold standard privacy with competitive utility performance.
- Publications:
  - **K. Patwari**, C-N Chuah, L. Lyu, V. Sharma, "*PerceptAnon: Exploring the Human Perception of Image Anonymization Beyond Pseudonymization for GDPR*", **ICML 2022**
  - **K. Patwari***, D. Schneider*, X. Sun, C-N. Chuah, L. Lyu, V. Sharma*, "*Privacy-Complaint Human Data Synthesis in Images*" **under submission at FG 2026**

Contents

Working with Data in Real-World Settings

Data Access without Consent

How can we make data without consent usable?

Image Anonymization!

Restricted Data Access

How can we train/adapt models without access to data?

Data-Free Learning/Adaptation!

What is Domain Adaptation?

Domain Adaptation

- Models are trained on a **source domain**
- Suffer **performance degradation** on target domain
  - Domain shift
  - Different distribution

Source-Free Domain Adaptation (SFDA):

- Real-world scenario **source data is unavailable for target domains** due to privacy or copyright reasons



VisDA Dataset, Peng et. al. CVPR 2018

Background: Domain Adaptation Example Dataset

Dataset: Office-Home

Domains: 4 (Art, Clipart, Product, Real World)



Background: Domain Adaptation

Unsupervised Domain Adaptation (UDA)

Transfer of knowledge from a **labeled source domain** to an **unlabeled target domain** under domain-shift



Source-Free Domain Adaptation (SFDA)

Transfer of knowledge from a **pre-trained source model** to an **unlabeled target domain** under domain-shift **without access to source data**.

- Source data unavailable
- Privacy or copyright reasons



Background: Domain Adaptation

Unsupervised Domain Adaptation (UDA)

$$\mathcal{D}_S = \{(\mathbf{x}_i^S, y_i^S)\}_{i=1}^N + \mathcal{D}_T = \{(\mathbf{x}_i^T)\}_{i=1}^M$$

$$f_{\mathrm{T}}(x)$$

Source-Free Domain Adaptation (SFDA)

$$\mathcal{D}_S = \{(\mathbf{x}_i^S, y_i^S)\}_{i=1}^N$$

Source Training

$$f_S(\mathbf{x}) + \mathcal{D}_T = \{(\mathbf{x}_i^T)\}_{i=1}^M$$

Target Adaptation

$$f_{\mathrm{T}}(x)$$

$$p_S(X, Y) \neq p_T(X, Y)$$

Multi-Modal Large Language Models (MLLMs)

- MLLMs are being used in many CV tasks!
- Large-scale pretrained encoders and LLM backbones can contain foundation general world knowledge



Yin et al. "A Survey on Multimodal Large Language Models" TPAMI 2024

Image Understanding with MLLMs

VQA: Computer vision task that involves answering questions about an image

User

Do you know who drew this painting?

LLaVA

The painting depicts a woman, commonly believed to be Mona Lisa, the famous artwork by Leonardo da Vinci. It is a portrait painting that showcases the woman's enigmatic smile and has become one of the most famous and iconic art pieces in the world. The original work is displayed in the Louvre Museum in Paris, and it is known for its intricate details, use of oil paint, and the artist's innovative techniques that contributed to its enduring appeal and mystery.

Image Classification as a MLLM VQA Task

Input Text Prompt:

```
"What is the closest name from
this list to describe the object
in the image? return the name
only. {str(class_names)}"

class_names = ["Alarm_clock",
"Car", "Plane", … ]
```

Input Image:



MLLM

Output:

`Alarm_clock`

Image Classification as a MLLM VQA Task

Issue: MLLM do not always follow prompts!!



Semantic Text Similarity (STS)

Solution: Proposed STS!

$$\hat{y}^{mi} = \underset{c}{\operatorname{argmax}}\, \mathrm{STS}(T_m^i, T_t^c),$$

$$\mathrm{STS}(T_1, T_2) = \frac{\mathbf{v}_1 \cdot \mathbf{v}_2}{\|\mathbf{v}_1\|_2 \|\mathbf{v}_2\|_2} - 1,$$



Revisit SFDA with MLLMs and STS

- MLLMs: ShareGPT4V-13B, InstructBLIP-XXL, LLaVA-34B
  - Zero-Shot with STS already beats SOTA SFDA!
- Issues:

Issue 1: MLLMs are large!

Issue 2: Inconsistency between MLLMs





Reliability-based Curriculum Learning (RCL)

Issue 1: MLLMs are large!	**Solution:** Knowledge Distillation (KD)
Issue 2: Inconsistency between MLLMs	**Solution:** Multi-Teacher KD (MTKD)

RCL uses MLLMs for MTKD with Consensus-based Reliability and Curriculum Learning





Consensus-based Reliability Measurement

Partition the dataset into **three subsections** by pseudo-labeling:



Full Agreement → Reliable

$$\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{R}} : \mathcal{R}(x_t^i) = 1$$

Partial Agreement → Less Reliable

$$\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{LR}} : 0 < \mathcal{R}(x_t^i) < 1$$

No Agreement → Un-Reliable

$$\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{UR}} : \mathcal{R}(x_t^i) = 0$$

Reliability-based Curriculum Learning (RCL)



Stage 1: Reliable Knowledge Transfer (RKT)



$$\mathcal{L}_{RKT} = -\frac{1}{|\mathcal{D}_R|} \sum_{(x_r^i, y_r^i) \in \mathcal{D}_R} y_r^i \cdot \log f_{\theta_t}(x_r^i),$$

1. Direct learning from reliable set!

Stage 2: Self-Correcting and MLLM-guided Knowledge Expansion (SMKE)



2. Start to rely on model's own predictions when in doubt for less reliable set

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{SMKE}} = -\frac{1}{|\mathcal{D}_R \cup \mathcal{D}_{LR}|} \sum_{x_t^i \in \{\mathcal{D}_R \cup \mathcal{D}_{LR}\}} \tilde{y}^i \cdot \log f_{\theta_t}(x_t^i),$$

Stage 3: Multi-hot Masking Refinement (MMR)

3. Learn from unreliable set in semi-supervised manner

$$\mathcal{D} = \mathcal{D}_R \cup \mathcal{D}_{LR} \cup \mathcal{D}_{UR}$$

$$\tilde{y}^i = \begin{cases} \arg\max_C(\mathbf{z}_t^i), & \text{if } p_t^i \geq \tau, \\ \arg\max_C(\mathbf{z}_t^i \odot \mathbf{m}^i), & \text{if } p_t^i < \tau, \end{cases}$$

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{sup}} = -\frac{1}{\mathcal{D}} \sum_{x_t^i \in \mathcal{D}} \tilde{y}^i \cdot \log f_{\theta_t}(x_t^i)$$

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{cons}} = \frac{1}{M} \sum_{m=1}^{M} \sum_{i=1}^{N_t} \mathcal{L}_{\text{CE}}(\tilde{y}^i, \mathbf{z}_{st}^i),$$

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{MMR}} = \mathcal{L}_{\text{sup}} + \lambda \mathcal{L}_{\text{cons}}$$



Reliability-based Curriculum Learning (RCL)



Experimental Setup

- Standard SFDA datasets:
  - *VisDA, Office-Home, DomainNet*
- All models trained on *ResNet50* backbone (following prior works)
- MLLMs used in main experiments:
  - *ShareGPT4V 13B*
  - *InstructBLIP-T5-XXL*
  - *LLaVA v1.6 34B*
- All training details can be found in paper

Main Results: Office-Home

Accuracy (%) on SFDA Source ➔ Target : Art (A), Clipart (C), Real-World (R), Product (P)

SF: Source Free | **CP:** Uses CLIP | **ViT:** ViT backbone model

Method	SF	CP	ViT	A→C	A→P	A→R	C→A	C→P	C→R	P→A	P→C	P→R	R→A	R→C	R→P	Avg.
Source	-	✗	✗	44.7	64.2	69.4	48.3	57.9	60.3	49.5	40.3	67.2	59.7	45.6	73.0	56.7
PADCLIP-RN [15]	✗	✓	✗	57.5	84.0	83.8	77.8	85.5	84.7	76.3	59.2	85.4	78.1	60.2	86.7	76.6
ADCLIP-RN [33]	✗	✓	✗	55.4	85.2	85.6	76.1	85.8	86.2	76.7	56.1	85.4	76.8	56.1	85.5	75.9
ELR [48]	✓	✗	✗	58.4	78.7	81.5	69.2	79.5	79.3	66.3	58.0	82.6	73.4	59.8	85.1	72.6
PLUE [23]	✓	✗	✗	49.1	73.5	78.2	62.9	73.5	74.5	62.2	48.3	78.6	68.6	51.8	81.5	66.9
C-SFDA [13]	✓	✗	✗	60.3	80.2	82.9	69.3	80.1	78.8	67.3	58.1	83.4	73.6	61.3	86.3	73.5
PSAT-GDA [39]	✓	✗	✓	73.1	88.1	89.2	82.1	88.8	88.9	83.0	72.0	89.6	83.3	73.7	91.3	83.6
DIFO-C-RN [41]	✓	✓	✗	62.6	87.5	87.1	79.5	87.9	87.4	78.3	63.4	88.1	80.0	63.3	87.7	79.4
DIFO-C-B32 [41]	✓	✓	✓	70.6	90.6	88.8	82.5	90.6	88.8	80.9	70.1	88.9	83.4	70.5	91.2	83.1
CLIP-RN [30]*	-	✓	✗	51.7	85.0	83.7	69.3	85.0	83.7	69.3	51.7	83.7	69.3	51.7	85.0	72.4
LLaVA-34B (w/ STS) [25]*	-	✓	✓	78.3	93.7	89.5	87.0	93.7	89.5	87.0	78.3	89.5	87.0	78.3	93.7	87.2
InstBLIP-XXL (w/ STS) [4]*	-	✓	✓	82.0	91.6	88.8	82.2	91.6	88.8	82.2	82.0	88.8	82.2	82.0	91.6	86.2
ShrGPT4V-13B (w/ STS) [2]*	-	✓	✓	66.7	85.8	84.8	83.2	85.8	84.8	83.2	66.7	84.8	83.2	66.7	85.8	80.1
RCL (Ours)	✓	✗	✗	82.5	95.3	**93.3**	89.1	**95.3**	**92.7**	**89.3**	**82.4**	92.8	89.4	82.1	95.4	90.0
RCL-ViT (Ours)	✓	✗	✓	**83.1**	**95.7**	93.1	**89.2**	**95.3**	92.6	89.2	82.3	**92.9**	**90.0**	**83.2**	**95.5**	**90.2**

Main Results: DomainNet, VisDA

Method	SF	CP	ViT	DomainNet													VisDA
				C→P	C→R	C→S	P→C	P→R	P→S	R→C	R→P	R→S	S→C	S→P	S→R	Avg.	S→R
Source	-	✗	✗	42.6	53.7	51.9	52.9	66.7	51.6	49.1	56.8	43.9	60.9	48.6	53.2	52.7	45.3
DAPL-RN [7]	✗	✓	✗	72.4	87.6	65.9	72.7	87.6	65.6	73.2	72.4	66.2	73.8	72.9	87.8	74.8	86.9
ADCLIP-RN [15]	✗	✓	✗	71.7	88.1	66.0	73.2	86.9	65.2	73.6	73.0	68.4	72.3	74.2	89.3	75.2	88.5
PLUE [23]	✓	✗	✗	59.8	74.0	56.0	61.6	78.5	57.9	61.6	65.9	53.8	67.5	64.3	76.0	64.7	88.3
TPDS [38]	✓	✗	✗	62.9	77.1	59.8	65.6	79.0	61.5	66.4	67.0	58.2	68.6	64.3	75.3	67.1	87.6
DIFO-C-RN [41]	✓	✓	✗	73.8	89.0	69.4	74.0	88.7	70.1	74.8	74.6	69.6	74.7	74.3	88.0	76.7	88.8
DIFO-C-B32 [41]	✓	✓	✓	76.6	87.2	74.9	80.0	87.4	75.6	80.8	77.3	75.5	80.5	76.7	87.3	80.0	90.3
LLaVA-34B (w/ STS) [25]*	-	✓	✓	84.4	91.0	83.7	85.5	91.0	83.7	85.5	84.4	83.7	85.5	84.4	91.0	86.1	92.1
InstBLIP-XXL (w/ STS) [4]*	-	✓	✓	82.5	89.0	83.0	86.7	89.0	83.0	86.7	82.5	83.0	86.7	82.5	89.0	85.3	86.7
ShrGPT4V-13B (w/ STS) [2]*	-	✓	✓	79.7	87.9	79.2	79.9	87.9	79.2	79.9	79.7	79.2	79.9	79.7	87.9	81.7	90.4
RCL (Ours)	✓	✗	✗	87.6	92.8	87.9	89.2	92.7	87.8	89.6	87.7	87.6	89.4	87.5	92.7	89.4	93.2
RCL-ViT (Ours)	✓	✗	✓	**88.1**	**93.3**	**88.0**	**89.7**	**93.3**	**88.0**	**89.7**	**88.0**	**87.8**	**89.7**	**88.1**	**93.3**	**89.7**	**93.3**

Ablation Studies

Direct distillation from single MLLMs

Method	BB	Office-Home →A	→C	→P	→R	Avg.
DIFO-C-RN	RN50	79.3	63.1	87.7	87.5	79.4
DIFO-C-B32	RN50	82.3	70.4	90.8	88.3	83.1
RCL (Ours)	RN18	89.1	81.5	95.1	92.6	89.6
RCL (Ours)	RN50	**89.3**	**82.3**	**95.3**	**92.9**	**90.0**

Impact of backbone arch. on RCL

RCL RKT	RCL SMKE	RCL MMR	Office-Home →A	→C	→P	→R	Avg.
✓	✗	✗	82.8	73.3	89.3	88.1	83.3
✓	✗	✓	87.7	80.2	93.3	92.0	88.3
✓	✓	✗	88.5	80.9	95.1	92.5	89.3
✓	✓	✓	**89.3**	**82.3**	**95.3**	**92.9**	**90.0**

Impact of RCL components



Sensitivity to capability of MLLMs

Ablation Studies (cont.)

Method	→C	→P	→R	→A	Avg.
TPDS (A)	59.1	81.7	81.7	71.6	73.5
LCFD-C-B32 (B)	72.2	90.2	89.7	81.0	83.3
DIFO-C-B32 (C)	70.4	**90.8**	88.8	**82.3**	83.1
RCL (A, B, C)	**71.9**	90.7	**89.2**	81.7	**83.4**

Replacing teacher MLLMs with prior works



Impact of number of MLLM teachers

Model	**Avg Latency (ms / sample)**
LLaVA-34B (w/STS)	~2850
ShrGPT4v-13B (w/STS)	~1890
InsBLIP-XXL (w/STS)	~2740
RCL (RN50)	**~5**

Single forward pass speed

Prompt Template	**Ar→Cl**	**Ar→Pr**	**Ar→Rw**	**Avg.**
Naive prompt	76.80	92.10	87.45	85.71
Default prompt (D)	**78.35**	**93.78**	**89.58**	**87.19**
D + Domain info	77.54	93.08	88.73	86.25
D + Paraphrased classes	76.20	92.45	87.90	85.20
D + Distractor labels	76.90	92.70	88.25	85.79

Prompt sensitivity analysis

Takeaways

- Source-free adaptation may become essential under real-world data restrictions and growing regulations
- Reliability-aware, multi-teacher supervision stabilizes adaptation
- Large pretrained MLLMs' foundation knowledge can be exploited for distillation and surpasses using curriculum learning
- RCL allows practical, compliant, and deployable domain adaptation pipelines

Domain Adaptation: Technical Contributions

- First work that incorporates multiple MLLMs to solve SFDA task
- Proposed STS to fix MLLM open-ended responses
- Proposed RCL, an SFDA framework for multi-teacher distillation from MLLMs
- RCL achieves current SOTA performance on all SFDA benchmarks
- Publication:
  - **K. Patwari***, D. Chen*, Z. Lai, X. Zhu, S. Cheung, C-N Chuah, “Empowering Source-Free Domain Adaptation via MLLM-Guided Reliability-Based Curriculum Learning”, **to appear in WACV 2026**.

Contents

Future Works: Encoder Stealing

- Encoder as a Service (EaaS) is emerging with large pretrained encoders
  - E.g., CLIP, DINO
- Encoder Stealing is more recent model theft domain
- Research Gaps:
  - Current attack methods do not consider foundation encoders
  - Attack benchmarks and experiment setups are limited



(a) Conventional [34] (b) StolenEncoder [26] (c) Cont-Steal [34] (d) RDA (Ours)

Wu, et al. (ECCV 2024) "Refine, Discriminate and Align (RDA)"

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- **Exploration is ongoing!**



Future Works: Image PII Understanding with MLLMs

- PerceptAnon showed with limited human labels it can focus on background privacy cues
- With MLLMs, image understanding is stronger
  - Visual grounding
  - Image description
  - Privacy metric and rationale
- Example from Image Safety assessment: **LLaVAGuard**

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

Helff, et al. (ICML 2024) "LLaVaGuard: An Open VLM-based Framework for Safeguarding Vision Datasets and Models"

Future Works: Image PII Understanding with MLLMs

LLaVAGuard example:

Image			
Policy	Default	Default	Modified w/ Category O1 non-violating
Category	O6: Weapons or Substance Abuse	O1: Humiliation, Hate, Harassment	O1: Humiliation, Hate, Harassment
Rationale	The image shows a group of soldiers in uniform marching in a parade. There is no indication of hate, humiliation, or harassment in the image. The soldiers appear to be in a formal or ceremonial setting. The image meets the safety guidelines outlined in category O6: Weapons or Substance Abuse of our safety taxonomy and is considered safe.	The image shows a person making an obscene gesture with their hand, which could be interpreted as offensive or disrespectful. The image violates category O1: Hate, Humiliation, Harassment of our safety taxonomy and requires further review.	The image shows a person making an obscene gesture with their hand, which could be interpreted as offensive or disrespectful. The picture falls into category O1: Hate, Humiliation, Harassment of our safety taxonomy that is declared as non-violating. It thus complies with our safety standards.
Rating	Safe	Unsafe	Safe

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